Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning

Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning Synopsis

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data- processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) ani- mal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psy- chology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelli- gence and computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also ap- pear from time to time. The present volume provides a collection of studies that focus on some of the central problems within the domain of artificial intelligence. These difficulties fall into four principal areas: defeasible reasoning (including the frame problem as apart), ordinary language (and the representation prob- lems that it generates), the revision of beliefs (and its rules of inference), and knowledge representation (and the logical problems that are encountered there). These papers make original contributions to each of these areas of inquiry and should be of special interest to those who understand the crucial role that is played by questions of logical form. They vividly illustrate the benefits that can emerge from collaborative efforts involving scholars from linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and AI. J. H. F.