
Opening Extract from...

Mapping the Second World War

Written by Peter Chasseaud

Published by Collins

Collins

MAPPING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Peter Chasseaud



THE HISTORY OF THE WAR THROUGH MAPS FROM 1939 TO 1945

MAPPING
THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Published by Collins
An imprint of HarperCollins Publishers
Westerhill Road
Bishopbriggs
Glasgow G64 2QT

In association with
Imperial War Museums
Lambeth Road
London SE1 6HZ
www.iwm.org.uk

First edition 2015

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-00-813658-1
Imp 001

If you would like to comment on any aspect of this publication, please write to:
Collins Maps, HarperCollins Publishers, Westerhill Road, Bishopbriggs, Glasgow G64 2QT
e-mail: **collinsmaps@harpercollins.co.uk**

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FRONT COVER IMAGE: Original 1942 caption: 'These Australian troops approach a German held strong point under the protection of a heavy smoke screen somewhere in the Western Desert, Nov. 27, 1942. This official British picture was made as they prepared to rush in from different sides. They are part of the Allied forces chasing the Axis forces westward across North Africa.'
This striking image was a staged morale-boosting propaganda photograph to mark and illustrate the Alamein victory. © PA Images

INSIDE FRONT AND BACK COVER: See page 227 © Imperial War Museums

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THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Peter Chasseaud

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The Map Collection of the Imperial War Museums

The Imperial War Museum, or National War Museum, as it was originally named, began to acquire maps and charts as soon as it was founded on 5 March 1917 to record the events still taking place during the Great War. The intention was to collect and display material as a record of civilian and military experiences during that war, and to commemorate the sacrifices of all sections of society.

Maps and charts were acquired by direct contact with the appropriate military and civil departments of government, and also by private donation, both during and after the war. In addition, maps produced and used by the Allies, and also captured maps and other enemy maps, found their way into the archive.

Many of the maps and charts had been used in military, naval and air headquarters in London and in the various active theatres of war. Their condition naturally varies a great deal: some are stained with mud and blood, and scarred by shell-splinter or bullet. None such is shown here, but several bear evidence of their field use in the form of manuscript annotations for enemy positions, intelligence notes, tank routes, etc.

Mapping the Second World War

The Second World War was a composite of two major wars – one instigated by Hitler's Germany and the other by Hirohito's Japan, with yet another opportunistically conjoined by Mussolini's Italy. Significantly, these belligerent nations were not liberal democracies; rather they were militaristic, authoritarian or totalitarian states presided over, in the case of Germany and Italy, by evil geniuses who understood all too well the manipulative power of the media and the way to mobilize mass support, or at least 'consent', through a combination of demagoguery and terror. In the case of Japan, not in any way a democracy, the Emperor was effectively controlled by a military junta.

Centuries before the Second World War, 'heretics' had been massacred in large numbers in religious wars, but by the eighteenth century it had been supposed that people were now more rational. However, in the late-nineteenth century counter-rational ideologies began to appear, based on concepts of blood, soil, violence and machines. In Italy the Futurist movement morphed into fascism; in Germany the equivalent force was national socialism, whose vehicle was the Nazi party, whose prophet was Adolf Hitler, and whose aim was to achieve *Lebensraum* (living space) for the *Volksgemeinschaft* (racial community). Accompanying Germany's military operations during the Second World War was the Nazi extermination programme, beginning with their own German population of 'mental defectives'; this was the product of their half-baked eugenics and their ideology of 'Aryan' racial supremacy, and it culminated in the genocide of Poles, Jews, Gypsies and other 'subhuman' groups.

The mind-numbing statistics of modern war are familiar territory, but it is worth remembering that the map's 'paper landscape' does not always 'speak with a grimly voice' about the horrifying experiences of war. To give the losses of the major fighting nations during the Second World War, the Russian population suffered over 20 million deaths, about half of these being military deaths-in-action, over 3 million being prisoners-of-war who died in the horrifying freezing, starvation and disease conditions of German POW camps, and some 7 million being civilians. Under German occupation from 1939 to 1945, 6 million Polish civilians were killed, half of them Jews. Of the Jews of all nations, the generally accepted total is around 6 million. The German population suffered 7 million deaths, over half of them civilians. British, Empire and Commonwealth dead amounted to nearly 500,000, about half of these being British. Six million Chinese civilians, let alone soldiers, died in the war against Japan which began in 1937 and finished in 1945. The Japanese lost 2 million civilians and 1 million military; at Hiroshima alone nearly 139,000 people died. Military deaths of the United States of America totalled 363,000.

The raw statistics tell a large part of the story of the war. Nazi Germany was militarily defeated by the staggering sacrifices of the Soviet people and the Red Army. Had Russia gone under in 1941 or 1942, Hitler would have been able to turn against Britain at a time when the U-boat campaign was being horrifyingly successful in cutting her ocean lifeline, the US had only just entered the war and the British bombing campaign against Germany was almost totally ineffective. At this stage, it was widely believed in the UK and America that Germany would defeat Russia, and the prospect of Allied victory seemed an all-too-distant goal. Luckily for the Allies the Germans were defeated at Stalingrad at the end of 1942, and again at Kursk in the summer of 1943, while the British victory at El Alamein in North Africa, followed by the US–British 'Torch' landings, made it clear that it was the beginning of the end for Hitler's Germany. Meanwhile, in mid-1942, the US had defeated the Japanese in the Pacific at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. American industrial might ensured Allied victory and her post-war hegemony of the Western hemisphere. Soviet victory over Germany, assisted by the Western Allies material and military support, including the Italian, Normandy and bombing campaigns, ensured Russian hegemony (given de facto recognition before the end of the war by the Western Allies) over post-war Eastern Europe.

It was a 'total war', foreshadowed as such by the First World War, with its mobilization of whole populations and use of submarine and naval blockades to starve civilian populations. Technologies were used which had been born before or during the First World War – aircraft, aerial photography, wireless (radio), poison gas (used in the Second World War not against soldiers but by the Nazis in their genocide programmes against civilians), submarines, sonar (Asdic), sound-ranging (artillery) and location (aircraft), signals intelligence (sigint), and carrier-based aircraft, to name but a few. New technologies continued to be developed before and during the Second World War, including radar, rocketry, jet planes, the A-bomb, wireless- and radar-based navigation systems. New forms of war emerged: *Blitzkrieg*, with its fast panzer columns and annihilating dive-bomber attacks; area

RIGHT: ABCA Map Review 23, 13-26 September 1943 including *Winston Churchill's Progress Report, 21 September 1943*. A morale-boosting report covering all theatres of war.

('carpet') bombing (notably of Germany and Japan); 'Deep battle', again foreshadowed in the First World War, became the norm. Capital ships (including carriers) were vulnerable to air and submarine attack. The fundamental 'principles of war' did not change – speed, surprise, concentration at the decisive point, seizing the initiative, unity of command, mutual support of all arms, simplicity, economy of force, security (and an exit strategy!), etc. Being stronger was useful: it was always a good idea, as the Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest pointed out, to 'git thar fustest with the mostest men'. It was also a good idea to have a good commander with an efficient staff and an excellent plan, to be agile and have rapid reactions, to be well-armed, to have good command, intelligence and communications, to be well-supplied with food, water, munitions and maps, to know what you were fighting for and to have high morale.

Most of the operations of the Second World War were conventional in nature, and often resembled those of the previous war. In all types of warfare, including unconventional operations, on land, at sea and in the air, and in the extensive use of combined operations, maps and charts were absolutely vital, as they were in the First World War and all previous conflicts ranging beyond immediate and intimately known territories. Among the enduring images of the war are those photographs and paintings of the war's nerve-centres emphasizing the centrality of the map, chart or 'plot' – in London the Central or Cabinet War Rooms, the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre and Submarine Tracking Room under the Citadel next to The Mall, the map rooms at the War Office and Air Ministry, those at Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Command, Civil Defence Headquarters, the Western Approaches headquarters at Liverpool, the D-Day headquarters at Southwick House near Portsmouth, and so on. These scenes were replicated in Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and indeed in all belligerent (and many warily neutral) countries. What they all had in common was the representation of the spatial dimension of



DEMONSTRATION OF THE
MOBILE PRINTING EQUIPMENT
held by
CORPS FIELD SURVEY COYS. R.E.
At
HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN COMMAND

520
CORPS FIELD SURVEY
COY. R.E.
1941

PAGE 1





the war – its strategic geography, extending beneath the sea and far into the air.

The map, which is a two-dimensional representation, model or picture of part of the three-dimensional earth's surface, provided commanders and their staffs at home and at the front with an easy-to-reproduce information system which modelled, in two dimensions (and in the case of terrain models in three), the complexities of natural ground-forms and human-created environments of the theatres and battlefields in which their forces were operating. The best commanders could read the map as easily as a book, and carried it inside their heads. The wiser commanders were aware of the map's fallibilities, and made sure that they supported it when possible by other information such as intelligence reports, reconnaissance and aerial photographs. They also knew how to move across the terrain in the absence of a map – navigating by the sun, the stars and by other natural indicators. The worst commanders couldn't read a map or give (or find) a grid reference, and they were a menace not only to themselves but, tragically, for their men. The Red Army suffered much from these cases, as a Soviet wartime report made clear, but they occurred in other armies as well.

On these maps they determined their strategy, planned and executed their operations, and instructed their subordinates. At the front the leaders of the smallest tactical units, down to platoons, sections or squads, orientated their maps, pored over grid references, interpreted the conventions, signs or symbols for terrain and tactical features, and gave their orders. To simplify, they might draw the key features of the map, and dispositions of their own and enemy forces, in the sand, mud or snow. On the map, the gunners marked their

ABOVE: Oblique view, Operation Sealion; German 16th Army map: *Op. Karte Nr.1*, showing MS German assault formations & movements for the invasion of Britain, summer 1940.

TOP LEFT: Mobile printing graphics.

LEFT: *RAF Target Map: Tobruk, July-September 1942*. MDR 500/1956. HQ RAF, ME.AI.1(d) July 1942. 512 FSC RE Oct. 1942.



battery or troop positions, and those of their targets. On the large-scale artillery maps, the firing data were read-off. On 'going' maps and smaller-scale topographical maps, tank commanders plotted their routes. On nautical and aeronautical charts, navigators did the same, while bomber pilots and their navigators studied flak and target maps.

The map production statistics of the Second World War reveal a stupendous output. Well over 3,000 million map sheets were produced by the Germans, Russians, British and Americans. Germany printed around 1,300 million sheets, in the German Reich, in printing plants in German-occupied areas and by a large number of field survey units with formation headquarters in all theatres. Up to the end of 1943, 1,233 million sheets were printed, of which 16 million were produced in 1943. In 1944–5, by which time the home production facilities and those of the *Wehrmacht* (not to mention the railway system) were being seriously damaged by Allied bombing and the Red Army and Air Force, map production in the *Heimatland* and by field survey units still amounted to some 16 million sheets. It is estimated that the Soviet Union printed between 600 million and 1,000 million sheets between 1941 and 1945. In the six months from the launch of Operation *Barbarossa* (the German invasion in June 1941) to December 1941, the Red Army issued 107 million sheets, while in the first six months of 1942 the figure was 55 million, making a total of 162 million for a single year.

The United States saw more than 500 million sheets printed by the Army Map Service during the war, with more printed in theatres of war by Engineer units. Ten million sheets were produced for the North African campaign – the Torch landings and Tunisia. 70-80 million sheets were printed for D-Day and the Normandy (Overlord) operations generally, and an equally large number was produced for operations in the Pacific and the Far East. Of the 210 million sheets supplied to US forces in northwest Europe during Overlord and subsequent operations in 1944–5, the base facilities under the control of the Chief engineers supplied 164 million, of which 80 million came from the Army Map Service, 28 million (after the liberation of Paris) from the French IGN, 18 million from the 660 Engineers Base Topographical Battalion and 38 million from the British.

Britain produced over 400 million sheets at home, including 60 million by the War Office's Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS, or MI4) and 343 million by the Ordnance Survey at Southampton; despite being heavily bombed the Ordnance Survey produced 194 million sheets, and civilian printing firms under its control another 149 million. In 1943–5, 315 million military maps were printed in the UK. Many millions of maps were printed by Empire and Commonwealth facilities (for example by the Surveys of Egypt, India, Ceylon, Australia and South Africa) and by field survey units in overseas theatres. In addition, a large number of charts and chart-maps were produced by the Admiralty's Hydrographic Department.

The Imperial War Museums' map archive holds many British operations maps covering all theatres in which British forces fought, and is also rich in examples of captured German military maps. It holds a complete set of German situation maps of all theatres in which German forces were involved, showing the dispositions of Axis and Allied forces, and large numbers of military topographical maps of those theatres of war in which German forces fought, or expected that it might fight. Many of the British operations maps, and also captured German maps, carry significant tactical overprints and manuscript markings relating to the operations in which they were used; notable

TOP LEFT: Battle of Arnhem: *30 Corps Situation, Night 21 September 1944.* From Dempsey & Pyman, *An Account of the Operations of Second Army in Europe 1944-1945, HQ Second Army 1945.* This map of the Grave–Nijmegen–Arnhem area shows the attempt by the British 30 Corps, starting on 17 September, to reach 1 Airborne Division which landed in the Arnhem area to capture the bridge over the Neder Rhine.

OPPOSITE TOP: *Disposition of Divisions of the German Army 28-4-45. G-2 SHAEF, 13 MRS RE.* [cropped around Berlin]

RIGHT: *Location of POW Camps, 24-3-41.* British RAF map of Germany: Info from MI9(b). The author's father, captured at Kalamata, Greece, in 1941, was a POW at Oflag VIIB at Eichstadt in Bavaria. This camp is located at the bottom of the extract, while one of the most infamous, Colditz, is in the centre.


VISTULA
Third Panzer Army
Ninth Army
XI SS Mtn
LVI Pz
V SS Mtn
XXXIX Pz
XXXVI
Ems
Blumentritt
Twelfth
First Para
Third Pz
Ninth
BERLIN
XLVIII Pz
VISTULA
CENTER
Twelfth
Seventh
Fourth Pz
LXXXV
Seventeenth
XII
PRAGUE
XC Corps


III
XI
VI
XXI
IV
IX
VIII
XII
XIII



examples are planning maps for 'Operation Sealion' (the projected German invasion of Britain in 1940), Tobruk and Alamein in North Africa, Italy and Burma, the D-Day and subsequent operations in North West Europe, and operations on the Russian front in 1941–5. Other maps relate to the strategic bombing offensives – German target maps of British cities, British 'fire-hazard' and target maps of German cities, and an American target map of Hiroshima. Notable charts of naval operations are a British plot of U-boat sightings and sinkings in the Bay of Biscay, and a series of charts showing the phases of the Battle of Midway. Other significant maps show German concentration and extermination camps in Poland, POW camps in Germany and the scatter of V-weapon strikes on London and Antwerp. A very important series of 'ABCA Map Reviews' – fortnightly wall-posters for British forces containing maps, photographs and explanatory texts, published by the Army Bureau for Current Affairs – is well represented, and indicative of the importance of providing information, not just propaganda, for an educated 'nation in arms'.

TOP LEFT: *Royal Artillery, 8 Corps, Fire Plan, 11-10-44.* British artillery fireplan for Operation Constellation (11-10-44), to destroy the German bridgehead west of the Maas at Overloon, near Venlo. The grid diagram in red is the map overlay for the fireplan (a timed programme for a creeping barrage, as developed in the First World War). Other data are for barrage, concentrations and target coordinates.

ABOVE: *Hiroshima 1:250,000, 1st Edn. US Army Map Service 1944.* Reprint in India June 1945.

ABOVE TOP: British *Fire Hazard Map, Hamburg, 3-8-44.* Zones colour-coded for high, medium and special inflammability.

Chapter 1

1918–1939: The Treaty of Versailles to the Invasion of Poland

THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

In many senses the Second World War was, after a twenty-year interval, the predicted second act of the First. The Allied Generalissimo of 1918, Marshal Foch had, at the time of the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, baldly stated that it was nothing but a twenty-year armistice. Germany's punitive treatment by the victorious Allies, and a reluctance within the country to accept that the German army on the Western Front had been defeated in the field, bred a deeply-felt resentment that festered during the next two decades and was exploited by the new Nazi (National Socialist) Party led by Adolf Hitler.

The fact was that Germany could no longer sustain the war in the late autumn of 1918. Her allies had made peace, and the German fleet had mutinied on 29 October, while the German army, which had been experiencing increasing indiscipline and desertion in the latter part of 1918, had been comprehensively defeated in the field. Revolution broke out in Berlin. The pursuit of her beaten troops all along the line was only halted by the Armistice on 11 November. The Kaiser abdicated on 9 November, and the following day the desperate German authorities told their armistice delegation to accept any terms put in front of them. Far from being 'stabbed in the back' by her politicians, Germany had been isolated and defeated by overwhelming Allied economic and military power – decisively augmented in the last year of the war by the United States.

Germany was made to suffer. She was forced to accept a 'war guilt' clause in the 1919 Versailles Treaty, was stripped of her wartime territorial gains (most of Belgium, part of northern and eastern France, and large tracts of Poland, western Russia and the Ukraine) and Alsace–Lorraine (gained from France in 1871), as well as her pre-war colonies, her heavy artillery, aeroplanes, large ships and submarines, and was burdened with punitive financial reparations. This heavy punishment made it obvious to the more perceptive among the Allied observers – including the brilliant British economist John Maynard Keynes, who set out his views in a book, 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' – that the Versailles settlement would lead to disaster.

Nor was Germany the only country to be resentful. Italy had entered the war in 1915 on the promise by the Allies that she would gain significant tracts of territory from Austria–Hungary, but in 1919 felt short-changed. Turmoil within Italy led to the seizure of power by Mussolini and his Fascists in Italy, and to Italian imperial expansion in Africa.

The massive and growing economic power of the United States underlined the relative decline of the British Empire, which was also being challenged by the rise of nationalism in Britain's imperial territories. America was pulling away from Europe and embracing isolationism, while her eyes were in any case turning westward to face the growing Japanese challenge in the Pacific.

The dismantling of the Austro–Hungarian Empire created its own dangers in the ethnically volatile area of Central Europe and the Balkans. To establish some kind of security, a so-called 'Little Entente' was formed in 1920 and 1921 by the newly created states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, together with Romania, as a defensive alliance against Hungarian revision and the prevention of a Habsburg restoration. Edvard Beneš, the Czech Foreign Minister from 1918 to 1935, and later President, was its guiding spirit. France supported the alliance by signing treaties with each member country.

One of the outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference, intended to deal with questions such as those thrown up by the Balkan situation, was the League of Nations, founded in January 1920. Its primary aims were to prevent wars through sponsoring collective security and disarmament, and to settle international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. It also awarded and supervised mandates over the territories of defeated nations, and attempted to protect minorities in Europe. A major setback right at the start was the refusal of the isolationist United States of America to join. Its peak membership was fifty-eight nations in 1934–5. While it had some notable successes, as well as failures, in the 1920s, it proved incapable of preventing aggression in the 1930s. Lacking an army to enforce its resolutions, it relied on the Great Powers to comply with economic sanctions, or provide armed forces which, to protect their own interests, they often declined to do. The League's ineffectiveness was clearly demonstrated by the 1931 Mukden Incident, when the Japanese annexed Chinese provinces, and the 1935–36 Abyssinian (Ethiopian) Crisis; the League could neither control Italy nor protect Abyssinia. Ironically, it was Mussolini who best summed up its weakness, when he quipped: 'the League is very good when sparrows shout, but hopeless when eagles fall out.' Germany withdrew from the League in the 1930s, as did Japan, Italy and Spain.

The economic problems of the early 1920s seemed, towards the end of the decade, to have disappeared. The Weimar regime had

instituted some sensible economic and financial reforms, including public works to mop up unemployment, and economic growth was rising. In this encouraging economic climate, support for extremist groups such as the Nazi Party was fading away. But in the United States in particular the economic effervescence was illusory, built on a fragile expansion of speculative credit backed by nothing but wildly inflating stock prices. In 1929, the Wall Street Crash burst that bubble, the banking system crumbled and the Western economies imploded. In the German-speaking parts of Europe, the collapse of the Austrian bank, Credit-Anstalt, in 1931 was the local symptom of the global malaise. As is the way with integrated banking systems, this bankruptcy precipitated a major global banking crisis. The world's central bankers and finance ministers responded in the worst possible way, by permitting credit to contract and imposing austerity instead of providing more liquidity and applying what were later called Keynesian fiscal policies to maintain aggregate demand.

In all this, Britain was a special case, illustrating economic and financial incompetence of the first order. The economy had experienced a brief post-war boom after 1918, but this had been ended by a period of fiscal austerity (the 'Geddes axe') as the government tried to balance the public finances after the massive public expenditures demanded by the war. Worse was to follow. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914–15 (and again in 1939) was, as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1925, responsible for Britain returning to the pre-1914 parity of the pound sterling against gold. This *de facto* overvaluation of sterling in returning to the gold standard led to savage deflation in the form of cuts in wages in order to reduce prices to remain competitive in world markets. This deflation was worsened by cuts in government spending. All this precipitated the miners' strike of 1925, followed by the general strike of 1926. The British economy remained depressed for the rest of the decade, and then came the Wall Street Crash of 1929, followed by the world depression of the early 1930s. Despite all this, Britain remained remarkably stable during the 1930s, unlike Germany.

In Germany, the economic crisis, which precipitated a massive collapse of output and a corresponding explosion of unemployment, provided a major propaganda opportunity for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party, allowing them to blame Jewish bankers for German and international economic and social troubles. Support for the nationalists of the right, and for the Nazi Party, grew in line with unemployment, as did support for the socialists and communists. The Nazis deployed a multitude of scapegoats, blaming Germany's problems on the Allies for imposing the drastic Versailles conditions and reparations, on the socialists and communists, on the 1918 politicians for the 'stab in the back' in accepting the armistice and for the 1923 hyper-inflation which wiped out the savings of the lower middle classes (*Mittelstand*), and on the Jews for all these things, and more.

Reparations were virtually cancelled in the slump conditions, but this had little effect on the Nazi resurgence. The Nazis promoted their racial and eugenic ideology, and the concept of the exclusive *Volksgemeinschaft* – the national community – raising the question of who was a member of the German nation and who was not; the Jews were told most emphatically they were not. Attached to this was the notion of *Lebensraum* (living space), of Germany's historical manifest destiny to expand to the east, her *Drang nach Osten*. Germany's increasingly raucous nationalists made France acutely aware of her own weakness.

Hitler and Himmler watch military manoeuvres, 1930s.

Hitler becomes Chancellor

The Nazi Party, between 1928 and 1932, rose to become the most popular party in Germany. While it won only 2.6 per cent of votes in the 1928 Reichstag election, two years later this was up to 18.3 per cent, and in the July 1932 election 37.3 per cent (13.7 million votes) making it the largest party. But economic conditions were by now improving, and in November 1932, the Nazis lost 2 million votes. Even at the peak of Nazi popularity, nearly 63 per cent of the electorate had not voted for the Nazis, but they were the single largest party, and could not be ignored when it came to forming a government with a Reichstag majority,

which is why the nationalists were willing to entertain a working relationship with the Nazis. But instead of them using Hitler, thinking that by making him Chancellor in January 1933 they could control him as a 'puppet' leader of a right-wing government, he managed to outwit them.

Following the Reichstag Fire of 27 February 1933, a most convenient event which is generally blamed on the Nazis, the Nazis engineered a decree by Hindenburg which abolished most civil liberties and transferred state powers to the Reich government, a key step in the establishment of a German totalitarian state. With Nazis already holding key government positions, the decree formed the legal basis for the imprisonment of anyone opposed to the Nazis, and the suppression of 'unfriendly' publications. By using violence and intimidation, Hitler forced through the Reichstag and Reichsrat (the second chamber) the Enabling Act, passed in on 24 March 1933 and signed by Hindenburg the same day, amending the Weimar Constitution to give the Cabinet, in other words Hitler as Chancellor, power to make laws without Reichstag approval. The Reichstag Fire Decree and the Enabling Act transformed Hitler's government into a 'legal' dictatorship.

German Rearmament

In 1933, a triumphant Nazi Germany began to lay down new warships contravening the Versailles Treaty, and in October withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Fear, tension and rearmament soon became general in Europe. The French, concerned about their falling birth rate and rising nationalism in Germany, built the Maginot Line, based on the resilience of Verdun's forts in the 1914–18 war, from 1929 onwards, against the instincts of Charles de Gaulle and the modernizers who believed in tanks, mobility and manoeuvre. Meanwhile, from 1936, the Germans were planning their Siegfried Line and constructed it between 1938 and 1940.

In 1934 Germany cynically signed a non-aggression pact with Poland, and in March 1935 conscription was reintroduced and Hitler publicly announced German re-armament and created the first three panzer divisions. In that year, Mussolini threatened Hitler with war to defend Austrian independence if Hitler intervened to support the Austrian Nazis in their attempted coup against the Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss. In 1935 a plebiscite in the Saar saw 90 per cent of the population vote in favour of reuniting with Germany, and German rearmament accelerated, causing Mussolini to protest and consternation among other European Powers, who called a conference to create the Stresa Front, comprising Italy, France and Britain. Defensive agreements were also formed between France and Russia, and Russia and Czechoslovakia. In June 1935, an Anglo-German Naval treaty was signed, Hitler agreeing that the *Kriegsmarine* would not exceed 35 per cent of the Royal Navy, while Germany was permitted to build submarines up to the total possessed by the British Empire. The subtext was that this was a *de facto* acceptance by Britain of Germany's right to rearm in defiance of the Versailles treaty. The French were rightly angered by this, particularly as they were not consulted, and the episode created a fissure in the Stresa Front. In October 1935 Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, alienating France and Britain by this wanton aggression.

Hitler now moved relentlessly to expand German territory and influence. In March 1936 his troops reoccupied the Rhineland, again in contravention of Versailles. In July he made the empty promise to recognize the independence of Austria, while in August the Berlin Olympics became a showcase for Aryan supremacy; a significant fly in the Nazi ointment was provided by the black American athlete Jesse Owens, who won four gold medals. War clouds loomed closer in this summer, with Franco's Nationalist coup against the Spanish Republic signalling the start of the Spanish Civil War. In October, the joint assistance given to Franco's war effort by Mussolini and Hitler was cemented in the formalization of the Rome–Berlin Axis. Over the next three years, Spain would provide a training ground and weapons test bed for the Fascist and Nazi war machines. A militaristic and aggressive Japan was expanding into China and Manchuria during the 1930s, coming into conflict with the Soviet Union, and in November 1936, Germany and Japan signed an Anti-Comintern Pact, aimed at communist Russia and its influence worldwide. Italy joined this Pact in November 1937.

***Anschluss* with Austria**

In January 1938, Austrian police discovered Nazi plans for an uprising in Vienna which would provide an excuse for a German invasion. A protesting Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg went to Berchtesgaden, near Salzburg, where Hitler bullied him into submission. However, recovering his nerve, Schuschnigg called a plebiscite but tried to counter the young Nazis by raising the voting age to twenty-four. Hitler threatened to invade if a plebiscite was held, and forced Schuschnigg's resignation by massing troops on the frontier. The new Chancellor, the Nazi Seyss-Inquart, called for German assistance to 'restore order' and, on 12 March, German troops marched in and Seyss-Inquart proclaimed *Anschluss*, or union with Germany. All this happened without a protest from Britain, or action from Italy. Germany was now much stronger in men, arms and materials, and the Allies weaker.

The Betrayal of Czechoslovakia: 'A Defeat without a War'

Hitler was now ready to gain control of Czechoslovakia, a prosperous, democratic country which believed it was protected by pacts with France and Russia. Germany now shared a frontier with Czechoslovakia on three sides, and along the German border on the western side of Bohemia and Moravia was the Czech Sudetenland, containing three million ethic Germans. During 1938, increasing Nazi activity in the Sudetenland led to great concern in the parts of Europe fearful of Hitler's ambitions. France was afraid that its pact might draw it into war. In August Britain sent a mission to Prague to try to arrange a settlement, offending the Czechs by advising President Edvard Beneš

Neville Chamberlain talking to the Press, 1938.

to accept Nazi demands, while Hitler vociferously supported the Sudeten Germans. More unrest in Czechoslovakia followed, and Europe seemed on the brink of war. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain (called by the Germans 'the umbrella man'), offered to meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden, and persuaded him to take no action until Chamberlain had discussed things with France.

By September 1938, Britain and France had effectively forced the Czechs to hand over to Germany the parts of the Sudetenland with a predominantly German population. The French also told Beneš they would not honour their pact. Russia would not act alone, so Beneš was blackmailed into accepting. Chamberlain again flew to meet Hitler, this time at Bad Godesberg near Bonn. Hitler now upped the ante, claiming that Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans was intolerable and that he was going to invade, setting a deadline of 1 October. He then agreed on a conference to achieve a final settlement of the Czech problem. At last France began to mobilize, while in Britain there was a 'trial mobilization', and London prepared for the worst with gas masks being issued, air-raid shelters dug and sandbags filled. Chamberlain notoriously broadcast to the British people a speech in which he dismissively referred to 'a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.' Some, led by Winston Churchill, argued that a stand should be made against Hitler but they were denigrated as warmongers, and in any case appeared to be a minority, while Chamberlain reflected the fearful, pacifistic and appeasing mood of the country.

The Munich Conference started on 29 September. Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini and Daladier were present, but the Russians were not invited and, although Czech representatives were in the city they were not called. The result was a triumph for the appeasers: a complete surrender and betrayal by the Allies, who caved in to Hitler's demands; Czechoslovakia had been 'sold down the river'. The Germans were to move into the Sudetenland on 10 October. Territorial claims by Hungary and Poland were to be settled, and the four Powers would then guarantee the independence of what was left. Chamberlain flew back to London, where he waved a bit of paper carrying Hitler's signature and proclaimed to cheering crowds, 'I believe it is peace for our time.' An angry Churchill, in a Commons speech a week later, stated more truthfully: 'Czechoslovakia recedes into darkness. . . . We have sustained a defeat without a war.' Thus ended the most shameful episode for Britain and France: Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, were from now on beyond the pale as 'the men of Munich'.

Czechoslovakia was now merely a rump, and a shattered Beneš resigned. It had lost a huge swath of territory, and over two-thirds of its iron and steel production, as well as a million people and its frontier fortifications. In addition, Teschen was lost to Poland, and South

Ruthenia to Hungary. In the final humiliation, the new Czech President, Emil Hacha, was now forced to place Czechoslovakia under German 'protection', and on 15 March 1939, German troops occupied the country, and Bohemia and Moravia became a German protectorate. Hitler now dominated most of Central Europe, but he was far from finished. Again for ethnic reasons, he now demanded the Memel land from Lithuania, and absorbed it into East Prussia. Poland was next on his list.

By 1938 the *Wehrmacht* had grown to thirty-four infantry, six armoured (panzer), and two motorized divisions. Expansion continued rapidly, fuelled by the newly acquired arms and manufacturing plant and munitions factories of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Skoda arms manufacturing complex represented a massive addition to Germany's war potential. Czechoslovakia supplied 450 tanks, 3,000 field guns and mortars, 500 anti-aircraft guns, three million shells, 158,000 machine guns and over a million rifles.

In response to Germany's obviously aggressive intentions, Britain had begun a slow rearmament programme in 1936 and, as in 1914, was prepared to send an expeditionary force – the BEF – to France if war broke out with Germany. On 29 March 1939 Neville Chamberlain's government announced the doubling of the size of the Territorial Army – part-time soldiers who would become full-time combatants in war – and on 27 April the introduction of conscription, a necessary move but too late to affect the immediate course of events. In France, General Gamelin, the commander-in-chief, had pledged an immediate attack on Germany in the event of a German attack on Poland, but it was not clear how this French offensive could be launched bearing in mind France's adoption of the Maginot Line with its concomitant defensive doctrine. There was also the problem of the German 'West Wall', or Siegfried Line, to consider.

1939–40: THE POLISH CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSO–FINNISH WAR

Poland 1939: The Outbreak of War

From the time of the Munich Crisis of 1938, if not earlier, war between Hitler's Germany and other European powers seemed inevitable. Hitler's successful foreign policy of opportunistic aggression had been in full view since 1933 and his actions during 1939 surprised few. Having the previous year gained the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, this extension of German territory provided him with the southern of two pincers enclosing Poland – the northern pincer was provided by East Prussia which had remained German territory under the 1919 Versailles treaty though separated from the rest of the Reich by the Danzig or Polish 'Corridor'. Hitler's next moves were part of the same pattern, aimed at isolating, defeating and absorbing Poland, but at the same time risking war with France and Britain. Perhaps believing that, as these countries had not moved to save Czechoslovakia, they would not go to war to try to save Poland, Hitler decided to go ahead by renouncing the non-aggression pact he had made with Poland in 1934, and also abandoned the naval limitation agreement signed in 1935 with Britain. He now made a firm alliance – the 'Pact of Steel' – with Mussolini's Italy, a further step towards the creation of the German-dominated Axis alliance he required to establish German hegemony of eastern and southeastern Europe. Then, on 23 August 1939, he delivered a bombshell – a Russo–German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact after the foreign ministers concerned, which shocked Poland and the western powers. Nothing, it was clear, would now prevent Hitler from moving on Poland. Chamberlain's government pledged immediate support for Poland, but Hitler was contemptuous of the military capability of Britain and France to intervene.

Germany's main excuses for tackling Poland were the 'Polish Corridor', separating the bulk of Germany from East Prussia, and the 'free-state' status, under League of Nations supervision, of the city and port of Danzig, with its large German-speaking population. The Poles resisted German demands and in so doing sealed their own fate. Hitler's *Wehrmacht* general staff had a plan prepared – *Fall Weiss* (Case White) for a new *Blitzkrieg*, or lightning attack, and the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact guaranteed immunity from Russian intervention while German forces – fifty-four divisions including six panzer (armoured) divisions – launched a 'double-Cannae' pincer movement, intended to envelop Polish forces in two huge pockets, the second to the east of the first. The *Wehrmacht* intended to trap most of the Polish army west of the Rivers Narew and Vistula – i.e. west of Warsaw.

In the north, Bock's Army Group North, comprising Third and Fourth Armies, was to smash through the Danzig corridor. Fourth Army was given this task; having secured the corridor it would then continue east through Bialystok before swinging southeast between Brest-Litovsk and Pinsk, avoiding the treacherous Pripet Marshes area. Meanwhile Bock's Third Army would drive south out of East Prussia in the direction of Warsaw, the Polish capital. In the south Rundstedt's Army Group South (Eighth, Tenth and Fourteenth Armies) was to push eastward through Silesia, using Eighth and Tenth Armies to wheel northeast towards Warsaw to meet Third Army, while its Fourteenth Army kept driving east through Przemysl and Lvov (Lemberg) before wheeling north to meet Fourth Army east of Brest-Litovsk.

Hitler gambled that the French would remain on the defensive on German's western frontier. On 21 August, addressing his generals at Obersalzberg, he assured them that there would be no intervention by Britain and France. His instinct was largely correct, as French forces embarked on what was little more than a gesture – a limited offensive into the Saar territory.

Poland was outclassed militarily. Germany's fifty-four divisions and 1,300 aircraft were faced by the equivalent of about thirty-four divisions and 388 first line aircraft, while Germany's six panzer divisions (2,400 tanks) faced nearly 900 Polish tanks, mostly light but including ninety-five which could fight on equal terms with German panzers. The Polish army was also inferior in terms of operational mobility and command and control. Until Hitler came to power, it had considered Soviet Russia as the probable enemy; as the threat from Hitler increased, that

Troops of the German 76th Infantry Regiment attacking the burning village of Lichnowy in Pomerania, northern Poland, 1939.

from Russia declined as Stalin's purges weakened the Soviet army and Russia's main concern became Japan's aggression in southeast Asia. Poland could not fight a war on two fronts, and by 1939 the Polish plan was to defend the western frontier. The Polish commander-in-chief, Smigly-Rydz, planned to hold off an attack in the frontier zone long enough for him to bring into play reserves which could deal with any breakthroughs. This was really a holding strategy, as ultimately Poland relied on Franco–British offensives in the west to restrain German aggression. For Germany, as in 1914, the problem of having to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously was an inhibiting factor, but Hitler accepted the risk. For Poland the decision to fight in forward positions increased the risk of envelopment and therefore of defeat before Allied intervention could save her.

Germany launched the *Blitzkrieg* attack at dawn on 1 September 1939. Goering's *Luftwaffe* bombed and strafed Polish airfields. Though the impact of this strike was reduced by fog which shrouded targets, and by precautionary dispersal measures, it caused sufficient damage to severely impede the Polish air effort. This, eroded by further fighting, was so weakened that, on 17 September, the remaining aircraft were evacuated to Romania. The *Wehrmacht's* ground attack, supported by heavy predicted artillery fire and *Stuka* dive bombers, and using panzer divisions backed by motorized infantry (panzer-grenadiers) as their cutting edge, carved rapidly through the Polish defences, followed up by the marching infantry divisions and horse-drawn artillery and transport whose task was to broaden the initially narrow armoured penetration and protect the flanks. Despite desperate resistance by the Poles, by 6 September the German Northern and Southern army groups of Bock and Rundstedt had achieved breakthrough and envelopment, and one panzer division reached the outskirts of Warsaw by 8 September. Between 9 and 12 September seven Polish divisions were destroyed in the Radom Pocket south of Warsaw.

Trapped Polish forces managed to counter-attack on 9 September from the Torun (Thorn) – Lodz area eastward towards Warsaw, but this move was met by German attacks driving in from all directions; over 100,000 Polish prisoners were captured around Kutno in this Battle of the Bzura River. The final act was the closing on 17 September of the eastern pincers by Bock's and Rundstedt's army groups in the Brest-Litovsk area, and the Soviets took advantage of the practical annihilation of the Polish army by invading from the east.

The Polish government managed to escape the country, to Romania, then to France, and finally, after the fall of France, to London; the Germans occupied Warsaw on 27 September. The *Luftwaffe* had not omitted to bomb the capital, killing 40,000 of its population. In a month, Germany had defeated a force of over a million Poles at a cost to itself of less than 46,000 casualties.

Subsequently, 8,000 Polish army officers, captured in September 1939, were murdered by the Russians at Katyn and other places in 1940. These were not the only Poles killed by the Russians. On 5 March 1940

Beria, the NKVD Chief, had proposed the murder of the captive Polish officers, and this was approved by Stalin and the Politburo. In total some 22,000 Poles were murdered at Katyn Forest, Kalinin, Kharkov and other locations. Apart from the army officers, they included 6,000 police, plus members of the intelligentsia, property and factory owners, lawyers, priests and bureaucrats. The ideological nature of this mass execution was obvious; it was intended to remove the major sources of opposition to a Soviet–communist occupation, and was a mirror-image of much of what the Germans had been, and were, doing in their German homeland and occupied territories.

The German occupation of Poland was followed by the absorption of the previously Germanic parts of Poland's northern and western territories into the German Reich, and the creation of the *Generalgouvernement*, a military–colonial government covering the southeastern territories. This German administration covered a large area of central and southern Poland, including Warsaw, Krakow and Lvov, and the long-term plan was for German settlers to take over the agricultural areas while the local Poles were to serve as a slave-labour force. Later, after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, eastern Galicia, which had been Polish territory until September 1939 when it had been occupied by Russia, was absorbed into the *Generalgouvernement*.

Nazi racial and political ideology was immediately applied in the occupied territories, a policy that was to continue following the German invasion of Russia. Special task forces of the German Security Police and Security Service (*Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienst* (SD)) were deployed to murder Jews, Gypsies, intellectuals, commissars, communists and other groups defined by the Nazis as due for liquidation. Working closely with the *Ordnungspolizei* (Orpo) or 'order police', the domestic German police force mobilized to assist the occupation forces, these *Einsatzgruppen* were responsible for mass murders. At Babi Yar and Rumbula, for example, over 30,000 and 25,000 people respectively, mostly Jews, were shot. Despite its claims, the *Wehrmacht* was also complicit in this murderous programme, being instructed by Hitler to assist the *Einsatzgruppen* and provide logistical support. Between the beginning of the invasion of Russia in June 1941 and the end of the war the *Einsatzgruppen* and their helpers murdered more than two million people, well over half this figure being Jews. But a more systematic murder process was to begin at the start of 1942.

On 20 January 1942, at the Wannsee Conference (Berlin), convened by Reinhard Heydrich, *SS-Obergruppenführer* and Director of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (Reich main security office), representatives of various government departments were indoctrinated and instructed to collaborate in implementing the 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' (*Die Endlösung der Judenfrage*) throughout German-occupied Eastern Europe; this involved deporting the Jewish populations of German-occupied countries to labour and extermination camps in the *Generalgouvernement* of Poland where they would be worked to death or murdered immediately. The programme was to be supervised by the *SS* (*Schutzstaffel*; Hitler's bodyguard 'blackshirt' organization). The death camps (*Todeslager*) set up in 1942 included Auschwitz–Birkenau near Cracow, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor and Treblinka. Over the course of the war, six million Jews were murdered in what came to be called the Holocaust, or *Shoah* in Hebrew. Large numbers of other non-Jewish groups were also killed.

The Russo–Finnish War (the 'Winter War') 1939–40

Until 1939 the main Russian military focus had been on containing Japanese expansionism in Manchuria. Then on 17 September 1939, following the German victory in Poland, the Red Army advanced into the Polish territory not occupied by the Germans. Between 17 and 27 September they advanced southwest past Vilna (Vilnius), and north of the Pripet Marshes they pushed west past Grodno and towards Brest-Litovsk. Between the Pripet Marshes and the Dniester River, Russian forces advanced westward, north and south of Lemberg (Lvov), towards Przemysl and the Carpathian mountains. Agreement was reached between the Nazis and Soviets on occupation zones. For the Russians this addition to their territory created a welcome buffer zone, as did the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in 1940.

The Russians were also anxious about their frontier with Finland, which lay far too close to Leningrad (old St Petersburg and, during the First World War, Petrograd) for comfort. When it seemed that Finland might be susceptible to Soviet aggression, Britain had promised to support her against the Soviet Union, but this was nullified when Sweden would not permit the transit of troops. The Russian forces attacked, under Marshal Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, the Soviet Commissar for Defence, on 30 November 1939. The Finns had constructed a 48 km (30 mile) defensive position – the Mannerheim Line, named after the Finnish Commander-in-Chief Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim – across the Karelian Isthmus lying between the Gulf of Finland which opened onto the Baltic, and Lake Ladoga, northeast of Leningrad. They were deficient in troops, and their tanks and aircraft were greatly inferior to those of the Soviets. Despite these weaknesses, the Finns managed to hold the Russian attacks which were aimed not

FOLLOWING PAGES

LEFT: *The Eastern Front – Boundaries February 1938. G.P.D. 365/21/4. 'Map from Ministry of Information' on verso.* A British general outline map showing Central and Eastern Europe, which became the Eastern and South-Eastern Theatres of War.

TOP RIGHT: *Germany, Third Reich & its Minorities, March 1940, Growth of Reich under Hitler.* Serial Map Service. Hitler aimed to absorb into the German Reich all areas of Europe with 'Volkisch' (German-speaking or racially Aryan) characteristics. This map shows the territories gained between 1933 and the attacks on Norway, France and the Low Countries in April and May 1940.

BOTTOM RIGHT: Jewish residents of the town of Piątek, clearing war damage under *Wehrmacht* supervision, 1939.

THE EASTERN FRONT


SERIAL MAP SERVICE March, 1940. Map No. 25.
GROWTH OF THE THIRD REICH UNDER HITLER
Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, 1919
Saarland (Saar Basin) returned by plebiscite 1935
Rhineland, remilitarized 1936
Austria, incorporated March, 1938
Sudetenland, occupied after Munich, October, 1938
Bohemia and Moravia, German Protectorate, March, 1939
Slovakia (nominally independent), German Protectorate, March, 1939
Memel Territory, March, 1939
Danzig Free City, occupied September, 1939
Poland occupied September, 1939
Boundary of Third Reich, February, 1940
Boundary of former Czechoslovakia, September, 1938
GERMANY
THE THIRD REICH TO-DAY AND ITS MINORITIES
Edited by George Goodall, M.A., F.R.G.S.
Czechs
Slovaks
Poles
Ruthenians
Slovenes
Lithuanians
Hungarians
Wends
Danes
Racial Minorities in Germany are shown as they were before the occupation of Western Poland by Germany. The re-distribution following upon the forced migration of Poles from the areas annexed to the Reich and the migration of German Balts into these areas cannot be shown as these movements are not yet complete.
Copyright, George Philip & Son, Ltd.
Produced by George Philip & Son, Ltd., for the Serial Map Service, Letchworth, Herts.
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

only at the Mannerheim Line but also northeast of this to the north of Lake Ladoga, even further to the north, west of the White Sea, and at the extreme north end of the Finnish–Soviet frontier in the direction of Petsamo. The Soviet army was demonstrating, to Hitler as well as to the Finns, the command weaknesses resulting from Stalin's purges of the late 1930s in which a high proportion of army group, army, corps and divisional commanders had been liquidated. The Finns proved very agile in their use of ski-troops to envelop Russian columns, attacking their flanks. The superior Russian air force proved relatively ineffective though it provided crucial logistical support to the front units by parachute supply drops.

The Red Army suffered about 185,000 casualties. Stalemate at the front led to Voroshilov being blamed for the Russian failure, his critics citing bad planning and incompetence. This led to his supersession by Marshal Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, and to an amazing scene at a conference at Stalin's dacha at Kuntsevo outside Moscow: Stalin shouted at Voroshilov, blaming him for the defeat; Voroshilov yelled back, putting the blame on Stalin for murdering the best generals in his purges, and then smashed a plate of roast sucking pig on the table. Nikita Krushchev, Stalin's successor, said it was the only time he saw such an outburst. Voroshilov was also involved in the murder of the Polish officers by the Soviets in 1940, arguing at first that they should be released, but later signing the order for their death.

Timoshenko, in February 1940, launched 13 divisions against the Mannerheim Line. In this attack he demonstrated the Russian attachment to the crude but effective use of massed artillery – reminiscent of Napoleon's 'Grand Battery', or Brüchmuller's 'battering train' of 1914–18. This was the opposite of *Blitzkrieg* – but nevertheless effective in breaking through on 15 February. Reserve divisions pushed through and widened the gap, supported by heavy tanks (the *KV*-1,



named after Voroshilov, weighed 47 tons) which were effective against fortified positions. Reeling from Timoshenko's blow, and unsupported by the still-weak Western Allies, the Finns agreed to an armistice in mid-March 1940, under the terms of which the Russians gained, among other territorial acquisitions, the Karelian Isthmus.

The significance of the Russo–Finnish War lay in the lessons rightly and wrongly learned both by the Axis powers and by the Allies. The Red Army suffered from poor discipline, tactics and leadership, but on the other hand the fighting quality of its soldiers was generally strong. The Soviet Army, once Timoshenko had been appointed Deputy Commissar for Defence, set about rectifying these weaknesses. But above all, it was the lesson Hitler thought he had learned from the conflict which was the most remarkable – for it caused him to embark on the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and thus, indirectly, led to his downfall. This 'lesson' was simple: Hitler became convinced that the Red Army could not stand up to the *Wehrmacht*, and that it would succumb to *Blitzkrieg*. But first Hitler had to resolve the problem of the Western Allies, sitting behind their fieldworks and the Maginot Line in France.

In 1940 the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic Sates. Finland was to become involved once more in war against Russia – the 'Continuation War' – when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. Germany and Finland became allies, and Britain declared war on Finland.

LEFT: *German–Polish Campaign, September 1939,* Main German thrusts red. Serial Map Service. Showing the highly successful *Blitzkrieg* attacks which began on 1 September 1939, with fast Panzer columns aiming to cut off Polish forces by enveloping movements.

ABOVE: Post-war Polish map of German Concentration Camps, etc, in Poland, 1939-45. After the defeat of Poland and its partition between Germany and Russia in 1939, various types of prison and labour camps were set up in occupied Poland. Following their invasion of Eastern Poland and Russia in June 1941 and the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, extermination camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Sobibor and Treblinka were begun by the Germans in the *General Gouvermement* area.


FINLAND
CLIMATE & THE WAR
Edited by George Goodall, M.A., F.R.G.S.
Statute Miles
20 0 20 40 60 80 100
Mean Sea-level Isotherms for coldest month, February (in degrees Fahrenheit)
200 Average Duration of Snow Cover in days (chiefly December to April)
Greatest extent of Ice in middle of normal Winter
Fast Ice
Coagulated Drift and Pack Ice
Pack Ice
Drift Ice
Ice Free
The Divisions marking the Days and Hours of Darkness on the borders of the map should be carried across the whole area.
Main Russian Thrusts
Railways
Principal Roads in the North
Canals
Climatic data after Atlas of Finland
For Forests see Map 9
Continuous Winter Darkness in days
Longest Night (23rd December) in hours
Days
Hours
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
SOVIET RUSSIA
Arctic Circle
PETSAMO
MURMANSK
SUOMUSSALMI
KONTIOMÄKI
KAJAANI
KUOPIO
JOENSUU
TAMPERE
TURKU
HELSINKI
HANGO
VIIPURI
LENINGRAD
L. Ladoga
Karelia
KARELIAN ISTHMUS
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

LEFT: *Finland, January 1940. Climate map.* Serial Map Service. Fighting in Finland, and in the northern parts of the Eastern Front generally, was bedevilled by dreadful winter weather. This map shows the typical low temperatures to be expected, and also the main Russian attacks. The blue areas with bold figures show the duration of snow cover in days, and the black areas the density of ice. Mean February temperatures go down to -14 Centigrade at sea level.

ABOVE: *Russo-Finnish War. March 1940. Showing the Mannerheim Line, etc., & Russian thrusts.* Serial Map Service. The Russians attacked Finland on 30 November 1939 but the strong Finnish defences, including the Mannerheim Line, stopped them. They tried again in February 1940, breaking through on 15 February. In March the Finns ceded to the Russians the Karelian Isthmus.